Louisiana Law Review
Volume 34 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1972-1973 Term: A Symposium
Winter 1974

Private Law: Property
A. N. Yiannopoulos

Repository Citation
A. N. Yiannopoulos, Private Law: Property, 34 La. L. Rev. (1974)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol34/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

19741

WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1972-1973

207

PROPERTY
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
PUBLIC THINGS: HIGHWAYS, ROADS, AND STREETS

Highways, roads, and streets may be either private or public
things in Louisiana. They may be public either in the sense that their
ownership is vested in the public' or merely in the sense that they are
subject to public use, whether they are owned by the state, its political subdivisions, or by private persons.' An interest in the public use
of highways, roads, and streets may be established by dedication.
In Ross v. City of Covington,:' the city claimed the ownership of
a strip of land by virtue of an act of dedication made in 1814. The
court held that the strip of land in question had been actually dedicated to the public and that the interest acquired by the public was
full ownership. One may not quarrel with the result, but the reasoning of the court requires comment. The court declared that "Louisiana recognizes two types of dedication, statutory and implied or
common law," 4 and, in effect, treated the dedication in the case
under consideration as "statutory." This rationalization is obviously
incorrect because one may properly speak of statutory dedication
only after the enactment of Act 134 of 1896. It is submitted that
Louisiana actually recognizes four distinct types of dedication: "tacit
dedication" under R.S. 48:491;', "statutory dedication" under R.S.
33:5051;1 "formal" non-statutory dedication;7 and informal (implied
or common law) dedication." In Ross the dedication was clearly a
formal non-statutory dedication. This form of dedication, like statutory dedication, conveys full ownership to the public."
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIv. CODE art. 453.
2. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY §§ 30, 33 (1966).
3. 271 So. 2d 618 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972), writ refused, 273 So. 2d 844 (1972).
4. Id. at 620.
5. See Town of Eunice v. Childs, 205 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969 Term-Property,30 LA. L. REv.
181, 183 (1969). See also Martin v. Cheramie, 264 So. 2d 285 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972),
writ refused, 266 So. 2d 450 (1972).
6. See Parish of Jefferson v. Doody, 247 La. 839, 174 So. 2d 798 (1965); Chevron
Oil Co. v. Wilson, 226 So. 2d 774 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
7. See Banta v. Federal Land Bank, 200 So. 2d 107 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967);
Comment, 30 LA. L. REV. 583 (1970).
8. See City of Houma v. Cunningham, 225 So. 2d 613 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); A.
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 35 (1972 Supp.). See also City of Baton Rouge
v. State Nat. Life Ins. Co., 271 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
9. See Banta v. Federal Land Bank, 200 So. 2d 107 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
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MOVABLES AND IMMOVABLES

In Bailey v. Kruithoff,'0 question arose whether a barbed wire
fence was a movable or an immovable. Defendant, by written though
unrecorded agreement, had leased pasture land and had reserved the
right to remove, at the termination of the lease, a fence and hay shed
that he might construct on the property. In accordance with the
agreement, defendant erected a four-strand barbed wire fence with
creosote posts, some of which were embedded in concrete. After termination of the lease, defendant entered the property and physically
removed the fence. In the meanwhile, however, the land had been
sold to plaintiff without any indication as to defendant's right to
remove the fence. Plaintiff brought suit against defendant to recover
the value of the fence.
In effect, plaintiff claimed ownership of the fence, and so did the
defendant. Determination of the question of ownership depended on
the classification of the fence in question as a movable or an immovable. According to well-settled Louisiana law, the transfer of a tract
of land includes all things that are classified as inmovable property,
unless, of course, exception is made by law or by contract." Conversely, the transfer of a tract of land does not include things classified as movable property.'2
In Louisiana, movables form a residuary category; things that
are not immovables are movables.' 3 The question before the court
was, therefore, whether the fence in question was immovable by virtue of some directly applicable provision. It could not be classified
as an immovable by destination because it had not been placed by
the owner, and, for the same reason, it could not be classified as an
immovable by nature under article 467 of the Civil Code. 4 If the fence
was an immovable, it could only be an immovable by nature under
article 464 as a "construction." According to well-settled Louisiana
jurisprudence, this article does not require unity of ownership.'"
10. 280 So. 2d 262 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
11. See American Creosote Co. v. Springer, 257 La. 116, 241 So. 2d 510 (1970); A.
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 57 (1966).

12. Id. See also Gibson v. Dalton, 220 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969); LA. R.S.
9:1106 (Supp. 1954); 9:5351-57 (1950), as amended.
13. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 475.

14. Id. arts. 468(2), 467. For a fence that might have qualified as immovable by
destination under article 468(2), see Latiolais v. Rowe, 170 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1965).

15. See American Creosote Co. v. Springer, 257 La. 116, 241 So. 2d 510 (1970);
Buchler v. Fourroux, 193 La. 445, 190 So. 640 (1939); Vaughn v. Kemp, 4 La. App.
682 (2d Cir. 1926).
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In a well-reasoned and scholarly opinion, Judge Hall, writing for
the majority, held that the fence in question was an immovable by
nature as a construction under article 464. Relying on Louisiana jurisprudence and literature as well as on pertinent French doctrine, the
court declared that the criteria for the classification of a thing as an
immovable under this article are size, permanence, and a certain
degree of integration with the soil. These criteria were satisfied. As
immovable property, the fence was transferred to the purchaser of the
land; hence, the former lessee did not have the right to remove the
fence. His ownership of the fence was lost, and his claims should be
addressed against the lessor."
The disposition of the case depended on appreciation of facts and
on a judicial determination in accordance with prevailing notions in
society. When property is sold without any contrary indication, a
fence of the type involved in this case is considered to form part and
parcel of the land. Question remains, however, whether the law ought
to protect a purchaser relying on the public records or a person making improvements on the land of another without the benefit of a
recorded instrument. This question has been resolved by the Louisiana supreme court in American Creosote Co. v. Springer7 in favor
of the innocent purchaser. From the doctrinal viewpoint, the solution
seems to conflict with the tenet of the Louisiana Civil Code that the
sale of the thing of another is null. 8 The conflict, however, is only
apparent. In the context of immovable property laws, the integration
of a movable with the soil results in a legal loss of identity; the
movable is no longer a distinct thing, but a component part of the
immovable.' 9 Hence, under the circumstances, the landowner may
transfer title as if the former movables were his own.
In Hargroder v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co.,20 a predial
lessee, cultivating lands by virtue of a verbal lease, sued a pipeline
company for damage to his crops. The pipeline company had ac16. See Prevot v. Courtney, 241 La. 313, 129 So. 2d 1 (1961).
17. 257 La. 116, 241 So. 2d 510 (1970); Yiannopoulos, Railroad Tracks as Immovables by Nature: Ruminations on American Creosote Company v. Springer, 19 LA. BAR.
J. 37 (1971).
18. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2452.
19. Id. arts. 464, 505-08. Technically, the combination of these articles results in
an exception from the principle that no one can transfer a greater right than he himself
has. The vendor of the land, though not owner of the things that have become immovable by nature under article 464, may confer a valid title to a purchaser of the land.
This result may be justified as a concession to the demands of security of title and
acquisition. The purchaser becomes owner of the things by application of the public
records doctrine.
20. 278 So. 2d 864 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
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quired a right of way servitude from the landowner while the verbal
lease was in force. The servitude agreement provided that the pipeline company was bound to pay "damages which may arise to growing
crops" from the construction of the pipeline, but another clause in the
same agreement declared that such damages had been "anticipated
and paid in advance at the time of the execution of this instrument." 2
In a suit by the landowner and the verbal lessee for damage
caused by debris off the right of way, the district court sustained an
exception of no cause of action against the lessee. On appeal, the
Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit affirmed on the ground that "an
unrecorded lease is ineffective against third persons to establish separate crop ownership. LSA-R.S. 9:2721. As to them the standing crop
is considered as part of the land. LSA-C.C. Art. 465. ' ' 22 The court
distinguished Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co.2" on the ground that
the lessee in that case had properly recovered by virtue of a
stipulationpour autrui.It is submitted that both reasoning and result
are contrary to Louisiana legislation, jurisprudence, and doctrine.
Leaving aside the question of stipulation pour autrui, a matter
of the law of obligations, this comment will address itself to the status
of standing crops. According to article 465 of the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870, standing crops are immovables in the sense that they are
"part of the land to which they are attached." Under this provision,
and in accordance with the rules of accession, unharvested crops
might be regarded as immovable property for all purposes and as
insusceptible of separate ownership.24 Legislative and judicial action,
however, have resulted in the recognition that standing crops are not
always to be treated as immovables 21 nor necessarily as a part of the
land to which they are attached.2" Indeed, for a number of purposes,
standing crops are regarded as movables by anticipation, as the law
21. Id. at 866.
22. Id. at 867.
23. 255 La. 347, 231 So. 2d 347 (1969); Yiannopoulos, Standing Crops: Movables
or Immovables?, 17 LOYoIA L. REv. 323 (1971).
24. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 504-19.
25. See. e.g., LA. CIv. CODE art. 3217 (privilege on growing crops); LA. R.S. 9:4341
(1950) (pledge of standing crops); LA. R.S. 9:5105 (1950) (lessee's crops not subject to
debts or mortgages of the landowner recorded after the date of the lease); Humble Pipe
Line Co. v. Burton Ind., Inc., 253 La. 166, 217 So. 2d 188, 191 (1968): "We are cognizant
of the fact that under certain circumstancessuch as those contemplated by article 465,
supra, crops are immovables." (Emphasis added.)
26. See Louisiana Farms Co. v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 172 La. 519, 132 So. 747
(1931); Fallin v. J.J. Stovall & Sons, 141 La. 220, 74 So. 911 (1917)(recognizing expressly the possibility of separate ownership in standing crops).
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looks to future rather than present status.27 In the leading case of
Citizens Bank v. Wiltz,25 the court declared that "the existence of a
right on the growing crop is a mobilization by anticipation, a gathering as it were in advance, rendering the crop movable quoad the right
29
acquired thereon.
Separate ownership of standing crops may derive from a variety
of contractual relationships, as leases of land or sales of standing
crops. "' It may also arise from real rights on the land of another, as
usufruct, or even from the possession of land in good faith. The owner
of the crops may always assert his ownership against the owner of the
land, 3' and by virtue of the public records doctrine, he may assert his
ownership of the crops against creditors of the landowner or third
acquirers of the land if there is a recorded document. In this way,
purchasers of standing crops as well as lessees of land may be protected in cases of transfer, mortgage, or seizure of the land.
Louisiana courts have consistently held that, as between lessor
and lessee, crops raised by the lessee belong to him 2 as movables by
anticipation .33 This separate ownership of the crops as movable property may be asserted against the landowner always and against creditors and transferees of the landowner only if the lease is recorded. 34
In the absence of recordation, creditors and transferees of the landowner are protected by the public records doctrine; insofar as they
are concerned, standing crops are immovables, as a part of the land
to which they are attached. In Andrepont v. Acadian Drilling Co.,"
on rehearing, the court disposed of the case without regard to the
classification of standing crops as movable or immovable property.
In this respect, the original opinion remains undisturbed and stands
for three significant propositions of property law: (1) Standing crops
belonging to a lessee, whether under a recorded or unrecorded lease,
27. See generally Frejaville, Des meubles par anticipation (Diss. Paris 1927); 3
PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRmTE PRATIQUE DE DROrr CIVIL FRANCAIS 105 (2d ed. Picard 1952).

28. 31 La. Ann. 244 (1879).
29. Id. at 246.
30. See Minter v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 180 La. 38, 156 So. 167 (1934).
31. See Flower v. Pearce & Son, 45 La. Ann. 853, 857, 13 So. 150, 152 (1893)
(lessee's right of ownership "perfectly good and valid" against the lessor even without
recordation).
32. See Lewis v. Klotz, 39 La. Ann. 259, 1 So. 539 (1887); Potche v. Bodin, 28 La.
Ann. 761 (1876); cf. Sandel v. Douglass, 27 La. Ann. 628 (1875); Federal Land Bank
v. Carpenter, 164 So. 487 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
33. Pickens v. Webster, 31 La. Ann. 870 (1879).
34. Flower v. Pearce, 45 La. Ann. 853, 13 So. 150 (1893); Napper v. Welch, 2 La.
App. 256 (2d Cir. 1925).
35. 255 La. 347, 231 So. 2d 347 (1969).
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are movable property; (2) This separate ownership of movable property may be asserted against the landlord always; it may also be
asserted against third persons protected by the public records doctrine, namely, persons acquiring interests in the land, only if the lease
is recorded; (3) If the lease is unrecorded, third persons (other than
tortfeasors) are entitled to regard the crops as part of the immovable
property under article 465 of the Civil Code.
It is true that in Andrepont, on rehearing, the Louisiana supreme
court sustained a claim for damages to the crops of a verbal lessee
on the narrow ground of a stipulationpour autrui. Nevertheless, the
court took care to point out that plaintiff did not assert secret claims
or equities unknown to defendant and that the defendant was not a
third person protected by the laws of registry. Indeed, the public
records doctrine has nothing to do with the law of delictual obligations and with the liability of a person who causes damage to the
crops of a lessee. The lessee's interest in growing crops is property,
protected by article 2315 of the Civil Code36 and by article 1, § 2 of
the Louisiana Constitution. 7 A tortfeasor is thus liable for the destruction of the property of the lessee, and the lessee does not need a
stipulation in his favor to recover damages from the tortfeasor. In the
case under consideration, the verbal lessee did not question the validity of the servitude on the leased land, nor did he claim damages for
the destruction of crops on the right of way. He merely claimed that
the pipeline company was liable for the destruction of his crops off
the right of way as a tortfeasor under the general law of delictual
obligations. It seems that the lessee had a cause of action.
In Long Leaf Lumber, Inc. v. Summer Grove Developers, Inc.,"
a real mortgage creditor claimed in a foreclosure proceeding that the
component parts of a central heating and air-conditioning system in
a residence were part of the security of the mortgage as immovables
by destination or by nature. An intervenor, however, claimed that the
component parts in question were subject to his vendor's lien and
chattel mortgage, unaffected by the prior real mortgage. The court
held that intervenor had entered into a building contract under article 2756 of the Civil Code rather than a sale; hence, he had no vendor's privilege under article 3227. Further, the court found that the
intervenor's chattel mortgage was valid, and correctly held that the
component parts of the central heating and air-conditioning system
36. Cf. Louisiana Farms Co. v. Yazzo & M.V.R.R., 172 La. 569, 134 So. 747 (1931);
Miller v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 148 La. 936, 88 So. 123 (1921).
37. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 2; Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Burton Ind., Inc., 253 La.
166, 217 So. 2d 188 (1968).

38. 270 So. 2d 588 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
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remained movable property insofar as the interests of the chattelmortgagee were concerned. Accordingly, the proceeds of the sale of
these parts were attributed to the chattel mortgagee rather than the
real mortgage creditor.
PERSONAL SERVITUDES: USUFRUCT

In Succession of Hyde,3" testator left to his widow of a second
marriage the usufruct of his entire property and to his descendants
of the first marriage the naked ownership thereof in the proportions
provided by law. Since the property subject to usufruct was not community property inherited by issue the marriage, the usufruct was
clearly testamentary. 5 Such a donation of usufruct raises the question whether the legitimie of forced heirs has been impinged.
In the case under consideration, forced heirs of the deceased,
issues of his first marriage, claimed that the bequest to the surviving
spouse impinged their legitime and should be reduced by application
of article 1752 of the Civil Code to one-third of the property in
usufruct. The district court rendered judgment in favor of the forced
heirs, but the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit reversed. In a
well-reasoned and scholarly opinion, Judge Hood re-examined the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and declared that article 1752
does not compel reduction of the donation to one-third of the property
in usufruct. The decision is eminently correct and furnishes a refreshing example of civilian methodology. Unhampered by erroneous lines
of jurisprudence, the court was able to reach the proper result by
direct reliance on Code provisions.
When the forced heirs of a spouse are issues of a former marriage,
the validity and effect of testamentary dispositions in favor of the
surviving spouse are matters governed, prima facie, by article 1752
of the Louisiana Civil Code. Prior to 1916, this article established a
disposable portion that was distinct and distinguishable from that
established for donations to strangers; hence, perhaps not without
justification, donations of usufruct to the surviving spouse of a second
marriage were reduced to the maximum allowed by article 1752 without regard to any other article in the Civil Code.' The present version
39. 281 So. 2d 136 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
40. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 104.5 (1972 Supp.).
41. See Succession of Braswell, 142 La. 948, 77 So. 886 (1918). It should be noted,
however, that French courts had consistently reduced donations of usufruct to a spouse
of a second marriage by application of article 917 of the Code Civil, corresponding with
aricle 1499 of the Louisiana Civil Code. See 5 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE
DROrr CIVIL FRANCAIS 199 (2d ed. Trasbot et Loussouarn 1957).
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of article 1752 makes it clear that the testator may give to his spouse
of a second marriage the same portion of his property that he may
give to a stranger. Hence, by necessity, the rights of a forced heir of
a former marriage must be determined as if the excessive donation
in favor of the surviving spouse had been made to a stranger. Nevertheless, Louisiana decisions rendered under the present version of
article 1752, have uncritically and erroneously followed the earlier
jurisprudence applying the pre-1916 version of the same article. 2 In
Succession of Hyde, however, the court signaled the error and correctly held that article 1752 must be interpreted in combination with
articles 1493 and 1499. An excessive donation in full ownership, made
to the surviving spouse of a second marriage, or for that matter to a
stranger, must be reduced at the request of forced heirs of the descending line in accordance with article 1493 of the Civil Code. If the
donation is in usufruct, it must be reduced in accordance with article
1499. In the past, this last article has been infrequently cited, seldom
applied, and at times overlooked.13 Indeed, Louisiana courts relying
on article 1710, which declares that the forced portion may not be
diminished by "a charge or condition" imposed by the testator, have
held that the legitime of forced heirs may not be satisfied by the
devolution of property in naked ownership,44 regardless of its value:
the forced heirs are entitled to take their legitime unencumbered by
a usufruct, which, of course, is a charge on the property. Accordingly,
donations of the usufruct of the deceased's entire property have been
erroneously reduced to the usufruct of the disposable protion. ' This
jurisprudence is directly in conflict with article 1499 of the Civil Code
which confers an option on the forced heirs, if the value of the usufruct given exceeds the disposable portion, either to execute the donation or to abandon to the donee of the usufruct the disposable portion
42. See Succession of Young, 205 So. 2d 791 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Succession
of Ramp, 205 So. 2d 86 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); aff'd, 252 La. 660, 212 So. 2d 419
(1968). For a case involving application of article 1493 rather than 1499, see Succession
of McLellan, 144 So. 2d 291 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
43. See Comment, 37 TUL,. L. REV. 710, 739 (1963); Note, 41 TUL. L. REv. 210
(1967). Clarkson v. Clarkson, 13 La. Ann. 422 (1858) seems to be the only reported
Louisiana case in which article 1499 (article 1846 of the 1825 Code) was applied
literally.
44. See Succession of Young, 205 So. 2d 791 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Succession
of Ramp, 205 So. 2d 86 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967), aff d, 252 La. 660, 212 So. 2d 419
(1968).
45. See note 42 supra. For cases involving the converse situation, namely, reduction of excessive donations of naked ownership, see Succession of Blossom, 194 La. 635,
194 So. 572 (1940); McCalop v. Stewart, 11 La. Ann. 106 (1856); Succession of Williams, 184 So. 2d 70 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
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in perfect ownership. In Succession of Hyde, the court correctly held
that reduction of the donation must be made at the option of the heirs
in accordance with article 1499.
The literal meaning of article 1499 is that forced heirs may exercise the option of that article upon proof that the usufruct is of greater
value that the disposable portion. However, in order to obviate the
difficulty of the valuation of the usufruct, certain French commentators have suggested, and courts interpreting the corresponding provision of the Code Civil have held, that forced heirs may take advantage of the option granted to them without regard to the value of the
usufruct.4 In effect, forced heirs may exercise their option in all cases
in which a disposition in usufruct in favor of a stranger exceeds the
quantum rather than the value of the disposable portion. It has been
suggested elsewhere, however, that article 1499 is susceptible of literal application without difficulty and that courts ought to accord an
option to the forced heirs only upon a showing that the value of the
usufruct exceeds that of the disposable portion. 7
PREDIAL SERVITUDES

Legal Servitudes: Articles 666-69
In D'Albora v. Tulane University,48 a landowner brought suit
against an adjacent landowner, his long term lessee, the lessee's general contractor, and the latter's subcontractor for damage caused to
immovable property as a result of pile driving operations. The adjacent landowner third-partied his insurer, the insurer third-partied
the contractor and his insurer, and they in turn third-partied the
subcontractor for indemnity or contribution. In his distinct good
style, Judge Redmann rendered an opinion that deserves attention.
In-depth critique of this opinion in the light of pertinent jurisprudence and rich literature would require the length of a leading article.
It is sufficient for present purposes to indicate solutions reached by
the court without any critical comments.
The court first disposed of the question of prescription, holding
that the one year prescription under article 3536 of the Civil Code had
not run because the action was brought within one year from the date
the last part of the damage was done. Turning to the question of
46. See 11 AUBRY ET RAU, DRorr CIVIL FRANCAIS 50 (6th ed. Esmein 1956); 3 COLIN,
CAPITANT ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIERE, COURS ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 810

(2d ed. 1950).
47. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 16 (1968).

48. 274 So. 2d 825 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
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liability, the court held that the adjacent landowner's liability was
without negligence under article 667. As to the liability of the other
defendants, the court considered the recent opinions of the Louisiana
supreme court and concluded that these persons were likewise liable
without regard to negligence. In the court's opinion, the liability of
these persons rested both on article 667 as interpreted in Chaney v.
Travelers Ins. Co.," and on article 2315 as interpreted in Langlois v.
Allied Chemical Corporation.' According to dictum in Chaney, article 667 furnishes the basis to hold not only the adjacent owner but
also his "agent or contractor"; according to Langlois, pile driving
operations qualify as inherently dangerous activities and, therefore,
as "fault" in the broadened sense of the word. Stressing the idea that
liability arose without regard to negligence, the court declared that
the owner, contractor, subcontractor, and the long term lessee were
responsible in solido. By virtue of an interpretation placed on the
contract of lease, defendant landowner was able to claim indemnity
and cost of litigation from his lessee. But the lessee could claim
neither indemnity nor contribution from the contractor, and, likewise, the contractor could claim neither indemnity nor contribution
from the subcontractor. This does not mean that the subcontractor
may not claim indemnity from the contractor and the latter from the
lessee. Indeed, language in the decision indicates that, in the relations among the defendants, ultimate responsibility is to be borne by
the lessee.
Conventional Servitudes
In Armstrong v. Red River, Atchafalaya and Bayou Bouef Levee
Board,5 question arose as to the proper interpretation and application of article 798 of the Civil Code. In the year 1949 plaintiff had
granted defendant, by written instrument, a servitude for levee purposes. The levee board promptly constructed a large drainage canal
on a portion of the land burdened with the servitude. In 1969, plaintiff filed suit to cancel the servitude over the part of his land that had
not been used by the levee board, claiming that the servitude over
that part had been extinguished by non-use in accordance with article 798. The court of appeal held that the servitude continued to
burden the entirety of plaintiffs land and the Louisiana supreme
49. 259 La. 1, 249 So. 2d 181 (1971).
50. 256 La. 877, 239 So. 2d 539 (1970).
51. 278 So. 2d 496 (La. 1973). For extensive analysis, see The Work of the Louis-

iana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Property, 33 LA. L. REv. 172, 191-97
(1973).
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court affirmed.
In a well-reasoned opinion and staccato style, Chief Justice
Sanders clarified an important question in the field of Louisiana
property law: article 798 of the Civil Code cannot be taken out of
context, but must be interpreted and applied in the light of article
790. The court classified the servitude of drain as a continuous and
apparent servitude, and declared that, according to article 790, prescription against such a servitude begins to run from the date contrary works are constructed. The court further held that article 798
deals solely with the prescription of the mode of a servitude, and that
prescription of the area of the servitude is governed by the wellsettled rule that use of any part of a continuous tract of land under a
servitude preserves the servitude over the entire land. The opinion
accords clearly with the historical sources of the Civil Code and the
intent of the redactors.
In Cyr v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp.,5" a 1942 servitude
agreement for a pipeline right of way provided that the grantee
should bury the pipelines "so that they will not interfere with the
cultivation of the land." When a pipeline was laid the following year,
the property was used for the growing of rice although the predominant crop in the area was sugar cane. The property continued to be
used for rice farming until 1970 when preparations were made for
sugar cane farming. It was then discovered that the 1943 pipeline was
not laid deep enough to permit tilling for sugar cane purposes.
Plaintiffs, successors in title of the original grantor, sued defendant, likewise successor of the original grantee, for rescission of the
1942 agreement, and, in the alternative, for specific performance. In
a well-considered opinion, Judge Landry found that the contracting
parties had "intended that the line be initially buried sufficiently
deep to allow cultivation of any and all crops then being raised in the
area, including sugar cane, ' 53 and sustained defendant's plea of 10
year liberative prescription. As the case was presented under a theory
of obligations, the result was almost inevitable for the additional
reason that both plaintiffs and defendants were third parties to the
original contract. One may wonder, however, why the case was not
pursued under a theory of property law.
Assuming that the St. Julian doctrine 4 was inapplicable, plaintiffs might have brought an action for the removal of the pipeline on
52. 273 So. 2d 694 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
53. Id. at 696.
54. See St. Julian v. Morgan La. & Tex. R.R., 35 La. Ann. 924 (1883).
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the ground that it encroached on their ownership. 5 Defendant would,
of course, claim that he had the right to maintain the line by virtue
of a predial servitude. But there was none. Defendant did not have a
servitude by title, because his title provided for a line so buried that
it would not interfere with the cultivation of the surface. Nor did
defendant acquire the right to have the pipeline in its present location
by acquisitive prescription, because the servitude was nonapparent 5 5
.55. In case of unauthorized interference with immovable property, the landowner
may have at his disposal various remedies. He may bring a possessory action, a petitory
action, a quasi-real action of trespass, or an action for mandatory injunction without
the historical limitations developed by the Chancery court. In the light of Louisiana's
"different civilian procedural background" an injunction "has historically been recognized as a remedy available to protect possession of property." Poole v. Guste, 261 La.
1110, 1126, 262 So. 2d 339, 345 (1972).
56. LA. CiV. CODE art. 766.

